Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness by Aziz, Haris
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
02
55
4v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
8 J
un
 20
20
Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
Haris Aziz
UNSW Sydney and Data61 CSIRO, Australia
Abstract
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ex-ante envy-free
lottery over envy-free up to one item (EF1) deterministic allocations. It has
the following advantages over a recently proposed algorithm: it does not rely
on the linear programming machinery including separation oracles; it is SD-
efficient (both ex-ante and ex-post); and the ex-ante outcome is equivalent to
the outcome returned by the well-known probabilistic serial rule. As a result,
we answer a question raised by Freeman, Shah, and Vaish (2020) whether the
outcome of the probabilistic serial rule can be implemented by ex-post EF1
allocations. In the light of a couple of impossibility results that we prove, our
algorithm can be viewed as satisfying a maximal set of properties. Under binary
utilities, our algorithm is also ex-ante group-strategyproof and ex-ante Pareto
optimal. Finally, we also show that checking whether a given random allocation
can be implemented by a lottery over EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations is
NP-hard.
Keywords: fair division; fairness; efficiency; Pareto optimality; randomisation;
envy-freeness
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
1. Introduction
Who gets what is a significant and ubiquitous issue. When making any kind
of allocation among self-interested agents, fairness is an important concern.
Does a fair allocation exist? Is there an efficient algorithm to compute such
an allocation? These are important questions that have been studied in fair
division for decades. In this paper, we consider the issue of finding probabilistic
allocations that are ex-ante and ex-post fair.
Suppose there are two agents who have additive utilities over three items
a, b, c. Both agents have the highest value for items a, then b, and then c. From
an ex-ante perspective, envy-freeness can be achieved by giving each item to
each agent with probability half. However, there are many ways to achieve
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this expected probability, some perhaps not too fair. For example, the uni-
form lottery over the following two deterministic allocations: ({a, b, c}, ∅) and
(∅, {a, b, c}). It may be desirable to achieve both ex-ante envy-freeness and some
weaker form of ex-post envy-freeness. For example a uniform lottery over the
following allocations is fairer ex-post: ({a}, {b, c}) and ({b, c}, {a}).
As seen from the example above, achieving target fairness properties is easy
when we consider fractional outcomes or view outcomes from an ex-ante perspec-
tive. Implementing such desirable ex-ante outcomes by randomizing over desir-
able deterministic outcomes can pose interesting challenges (see, e.g. [1, 10]).
This issue was explored by Freeman et al. [14]. They focussed on ex-ante envy-
freeness and ex-post envy-freeness up to one item as the target fairness require-
ments. Both of the properties are known to be individually achievable. An
ex-ante envy-free random allocation always exists (for example the outcome
of the probabilistic serial rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] achieves ex-ante
envy-freeness). Similarly, a deterministic envy-free up to one item (EF1) al-
location always exists [9]. For example, running the round robin sequential
algorithm obtains an EF1 allocation [11]. Freeman et al. [14] explore the ques-
tion of achieving ex-ante envy-freeness and ex-post EF1 simultaneously. They
showed that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a lottery over
envy-free up to one item allocations that is also ex-ante envy-free.1
The inventive polynomial-time algorithm of Freeman et al. [14] has a cou-
ple of possible limitations. Firstly, it requires using the machinery of linear
programming separation oracles. It may be desirable to get similar results by
simpler combinatorial algorithms. Secondly, the algorithm of Freeman et al. is
not ex-post weakly SD (stochastic dominance)-efficient and hence not ex-ante
weakly SD-efficient. This is evident from Example 2 of Freeman et al. where
they note that their algorithm does not satisfy ordinal efficiency.2 The fact that
an algorithm is not ex-post weakly SD-efficient implies that it can return a deter-
ministic allocation such that there exists another deterministic allocation that
gives each agent strictly more utility for all utility functions consistent with the
underlying ordinal preferences. Another implication of violating ex-post weak
SD-efficiency is that all the agents can trade one of their items for another item
to get more utility. Such unamiguous compromise on welfare can be undesirable.
For example, the random serial dictatorship rule (which is ex-post SD-efficient)
has received criticism that it is not ex-ante SD-efficient [7].
We overcome the two limitations discussed above and show that the algo-
rithmic result of Freeman et al. [14] can be achieved in a relatively simpler and
faster way while additionally satisfying SD-efficiency. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our is the first algorithm to simultaneously satisfy weak SD-efficiency,
ex-ante EF, and ex-post EF1. The latter two guarantees even hold for all addi-
1Freeman et al. [14] also presented several other results charting the landscape of possibil-
ity and impossibility results when considering fairness and efficiency properties ex post and
ex-ante. In particular, they study in detail the rule that maximizes ex-ante Nash welfare.
However, they show that the rule cannot be implemented by EF1 allocations.
2SD-efficiency is also referred to as ordinal efficiency in the literature [7].
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tive utilities consistent with the agents’ underlying ordinal preferences. In other
words, our algorithm satisfies ex-ante SD-envy-freeness and ex-post SD-EF1.
We also show how the algorithm can be further modified by using parametric
network flows to additionally achieve both ex-ante and ex-post SD-efficiency.
Our results can be viewed as being optimal in the view of the following two
impossibility results that we prove. Firstly, ex-ante SD-envy-freeness, ex-post
EF1, and ex-post Pareto optimality are incompatible. Secondly, ex-ante Pareto
optimality and ex-ante SD-envy-freeness are incompatible.
Our algorithm calls the probabilistic serial algorithm as well as the Birkhoff’s
decomposition algorithm as subroutines. Freeman et al. raised the question
whether the outcome of the probabilistic serial algorithm can be implemented
using ex-post EF1 randomized allocations: “we were not able to determine
whether the fractional allocation produced by probabilistic serial can always be
implemented using an ex-post EF1 randomized allocation.” We answer the ques-
tion in the affirmative: our algorithm’s outcome is ex-ante equivalent to the
outcome of the probabilistic serial rule. In particular, it can be viewed as a
desirable way to instantiate the probabilistic serial outcome. Under binary util-
ities, our algorithm is group-strategyproof, ex-ante efficient, ex-ante envy-free,
and ex-post EF1. Finally, we also show that checking whether a given ran-
dom allocation can be represented over a lottery over EF1 and Pareto optimal
allocations is NP-hard.
2. Preliminaries
An allocation problem is a triple (N,O, u) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , om} is the set of objects, and u specifies an additive
utility function ui : O → R+. The utility function profile u induces the prefer-
ence profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) which specifies for each agent i his preferences %i
over objects in O such that o %i o
′ if and only if ui(o) ≥ ui(o′). We use ≻i for
the strict part of %i, i.e., o ≻i o′ iff o %i o′ but not o′ %i o. A random allocation
p is a (n ×m) matrix [pi,oj ] such that pi,oj ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O;
and
∑
i∈N pi,oj = 1 for all oj ∈ O. For a given set S ⊂ N , we will refer by %S
the preference profile restricted to agents in S.
The value pi,oj represents the probability of object oj being allocated to
agent i. Each row pi = (pi,o1 , . . . , pi,om) represents the allocation of agent i.
The set of columns correspond to the objects o1, . . . , om. A feasible random
allocation is deterministic if pi,o ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O. When we say
‘an allocation’, we will mean random allocation unless we specially specify it is
deterministic.
For any agent i, j ∈ N and an allocation p, the utility of agent i for a
bundle pj is ui(pj) =
∑
o∈O pj,oui(o). Given two random allocations p and
q, pi %
SD
i qi that is, an agent i SD prefers allocation pi to allocation qi if∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
pi,oj ≥
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
qi,oj for all o ∈ O. We write pi ≻
SD
i qi if
pi %
SD
i qi and not qi %
SD
i pi.
3
Fairness Properties. A random allocation p is SD-envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N ,
pi %
SD
i pj . An random allocation p is envy-free (EF) if ui(pi) ≥ ui(pj) for all
i, j ∈ N . For an agent’s allocation pj , we will denote by p
−o
j the allocation pj in
which pj,o is set to 0. For an agent’s allocation pj and S ⊆ O, we will denote by
p−Sj the allocation pj in which pj,o is set to 0 for all o ∈ S. A random allocation
p is SD-EF1 if for all i, j ∈ N , either pi %SDi pj or pi %
SD
i p
−o
j for some o. o. A
random allocation p is envy-free up to k items (EFk) if there exist some S ⊂ O
such that |S| ≤ k such that ui(p
−S
i ) ≥ ui(p
−S
j ). Note that SD-envy-freeness
implies envy-freeness which implies EFk. And SD-EF implies SD-EFk.
A given random allocation can be implemented by a lottery over determin-
istic allocations.3 We call the latter an implementation of the given random
allocation. We say that random allocation p satisfies a property X ex-ante if
the fractional allocation representing p satisfies property X . When we discuss
the ex post properties of a random allocation p, we will also need to consider
the lottery implementation over deterministic allocations which achieves the ran-
dom allocation p. In that case we say that random assignment with a lottery
implementation deterministic allocations over M1, . . . ,MK satisfies property X
ex-post if M1, . . . ,MK satisfy property X . Therefore for any given property for
allocations, we consider it ex-ante as well as ex-post. Figure 1 shows the key
fairness concepts that are appropriate from ex-ante and ex-post perspectives.
Note that we do not focus ex-post envy-freeness since a deterministic envy-free
allocation is not guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, checking whether a deter-
ministic envy-free allocation exists is NP-complete even for 1-0 utilities [2].
ex-ante
fairness
ex-ante
SD-EF
ex-ante
EF
ex-post
fairness
ex-post
SD-EF1
ex-post
EF1
Figure 1: Logical relations between fairness concepts.
Example 1. Consider the example in which N = {1, 2}, O = {a, b, c, d} and
the agents have the following utilities over four items.
3The statement follows from the well-known Carathe´odory’s Theorem.
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a b c d
1 4 3 2 1
2 4 2 3 1
Then, the following is one possible random allocation.
p =
a b c d( )
1 1/2 1 0 1/2
2 1/2 0 1 1/2
In the allocation, u1(p1) =
1
2 (4) + 1(3) +
1
2 (1) = 5.5 and u1(p2) =
1
2 (4) +
1(2) + 12 (1) = 4.5. Hence agent 1 is not envious of agent 2.
Allocation p can be implemented by the following uniform lottery over two
deterministic allocations as follows.
p = 12
a b c d( )
1 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 1 1
+ 12
a b c d( )
1 0 1 0 1
2 1 0 1 0
We say that a deterministic allocation q is consistent with a random alloca-
tion p if for each qi,o = 1, we have that pi,o > 0. For n = m, a deterministic
allocation can be represented by a permutation matrix in which an entry of
one denotes the row agent getting the column object. A decomposition of a
random allocation p is a sum
∑k
i=1 λiPi such that λi ∈ (0, 1] for i ∈ {1, . . . , k},∑k
i=1 λi = 1, and each Pi is a permutation matrix (consistent with p).
3. The PS-Lottery Algorithm
In this section, we present our main algorithm that we refer to as the PS-
Lottery Algorithm. Before we proceed, we summarize two well-known algo-
rithms that we will use as building blocks for our algorithm to simultaneously
achieve ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1.
Probabilistic Serial (PS) Algorithm. The PS rule [7] takes as input the strict
ordinal preferences of agents over items as well as the available amounts of each
of the items. Agents start eating their most preferred item at unit speed until
the item is consumed. They continue eating their most preferred items until
all the items are consumed. The outcome is a random allocation in which each
agent’s probability of getting an item is the fraction of the item that she ate.
Intially, only presented for the case of single-unit demands, the rule extends
seamlessly for the case where agents want to get multiple items [21]. Although
described as a continuous rule where agents eat infinitesimal amounts, the PS
outcome can be computed by a discrete algorithm in polynomial time O(nm)
(see the appendix).
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Birkhoff’s Algorithm. Consider any random allocation with n agents and n
items in which each agent gets one unit of items. Birkhoff’s algorithm can
decompose such a random allocation (which can be represented by a bistochastic
matrix) into a convex combination of at most n2−n+1 deterministic allocations
(represented by permutation matrices) [6, 22]. The following is a description
of Birkhoff’s algorithm (a formal description is given in the appendix). We
initialize i to 1. For a bistochastic matrixM , a permutation matrix Pi consistent
with M is guaranteed to exist. Such a permutation matrix corresponds to a
perfect matching in a bipartite graph (N ∪O,E) where (i, o) ∈ E iff Mi,o > 0.
Such a perfect matching and hence the permutation matrix can be computed
via the Hopcroft-Karp-Karzanov algorithm which takes time O(n2.5) [17, 18].
We initialize index i to 1. M is set to M −λiPi where λi ∈ (0, 1] is the smallest
non-zero entry in Pi. Index i is incremented by one. The updated M is again
bistochastic. The process is repeated (say k − 1 times) until M is the zero
matrix. Then M =
∑k
i=1 λiPi.
Now that we have defined the two algorithms, we are in a position to present
Algorithm 1. The high-level description of the algorithm is as follows. We first
add some dummy items to ensure that there are nc items. The expanded set of
items is called O′. We then simulate PS. We track information about how much
of each item has been eaten at time steps 1, . . . , c. We use this information to
form an allocation q′ of items in O′ to agents in N ′ = {i1, . . . , ic : i ∈ N}. The
agents i1, . . . , ic are called the representative agents of each agent i. An agent
ij’s allocation is what agent i ate in time interval [j − 1, j]. Allocation q′ can
be represented by a bistochastic matrix. We decompose q′ into a convex com-
bination of permutation matrices via Birkhoff’s algorithm. The permutation
matrices are suitably modified to remove the dummy items and also give the
allocation of all representatives to the agent they represent. The convex com-
bination over the modified permutation matrices gives us the desired solution,
which is both ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1.
Before we prove the main properties of the PS-Lottery Algorithm, we recall a
class of deterministic allocation algorithms. The sequential allocation algorithm
takes as input a sequence π of turns of the agents and returns a deterministic
allocation which is a result of agents picking a most preferred unallocated item
in their turn. A sequence of turns is called recursively balanced (RB) if at each
prefix, all agents have the same number of turns, or differ by one. An RB
sequence can be viewed as agents coming in c rounds. Note that cn ≤ (m+ n).
In each round except the last one, each agent gets exactly one turn. Since
each agent weakly prefers her picked item over all items picked in later rounds,
it can easily be proved that the outcome of sequential allocation with an RB
sequence is EF1 [3].4 Since sequential allocation with an RB sequence only uses
ordinal preferences of the agents, it is EF1 with respect to all positive utilities
4In fact an RB allocation satisfies a stronger propery called strong EF1. Stronger EF1
requires that upon removing the same item from agent i’s bundle, no other agent j envies i,
for all i and j. The property was proposed by Conitzer et al. [12].
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Algorithm 1 PS-Lottery Algorithm
Input: I = (N,O,%) where |N | = n, |O| = m and c = ⌈m/n⌉.
Output: EF fractional allocation q =
∑K
j=1 λjPi where each Pj represents a
deterministic EF1 allocation and K ≤ (cn)2 − 2cn+ 2.
1: If m is a multiple of n, D = ∅. Else, D = {d1, . . . , dnc−m}.
2: O′ ← O ∪D so that |O′| = cn.
3: N ′ = {i1, . . . , ic : i ∈ N}. The agents i1, . . . ic are termed as the representa-
tives of agent i.
4: Set preference profile %′ of agents in N ′ ∪N as follows: for all o, o′ ∈ O and
for all ij for j ∈ {1, . . . , c}, o %′ij o
′ iff o %i o
′. For all o ∈ O and d ∈ D,
o ≻′ij d. All the ties in %
′ are broken lexicographically.
5: Run PS on instance (N,O′,%′N ) to get a random outcome r.
6: For each bundle ri, let agent i re-eat her bundle at unit-speed according to
preferences of her representative agents %′ik with each representative agent
ij eating on behalf of agent i in time interval [j − 1, j]. Let the result
of this eating be allocation q′ which is an allocation of items O′ to agent
representatives in N ′.
7: For the (bistochastic) matrix corresponding to q′, compute a Birkhoff de-
composition q′ =
∑K
j=1 λjP
′
j where K ≤ (cn)
2 − 2cn+ 2.
8: Convert q′ =
∑K
j=1 λjP
′
j into q =
∑K
j=1 λjPj where all the dummy items
are ignored and each agent gets the allocation of its representatives.
9: return Allocation q for instance I and its decomposition
∑K
j=1 λjPj .
consistent with the ordinal preferences [3] and hence SD-EF. An allocation is
called an RB-allocation if it is an outcome of sequential allocation with respect
to some RB-sequence. We will use the perspective of RB-allocations to establish
that our algorithm returns a lottery over EF1 allocations.
Theorem 1. Let c = ⌈m/n⌉. Algorithm 1 is polynomial-time algorithm that
takes time O((cn)4) that computes a lottery over at most (cn)2 deterministic
EF1 allocations that is equivalent to the outcome of the probabilistic serial algo-
rithm.
Proof. Algorithm 1 works as follows. If m < n, we set D = {d1, . . . , dn−m}. If
m > n, we set D = {d1, . . . , dcn−m}. We are now in a position to fix a new
allocation instance I ′ = (N ′, O′,%′) that only uses ordinal preferences. The item
set O′ is O∪D where |O′| = cn. The ‘representative’ setN ′ is {i1, . . . , ic :i ∈ N}.
Note that the number of representatives |N ′| is equal to the number of items
|O′|. The preferences are consistent with the underlying preference profile. The
preferences %′ of the representatives are set as follows: for all o, o′ ∈ O and for
all ij for j ∈ {1, . . . , c} o %′ij o iff o %i o. For all o ∈ O and d ∈ D, o ≻
′
ij
d. All
the ties in %′ are broken lexicographically.
Note that for the modified allocation problem instance I ′, an allocation has
a corresponding allocation in the original instance I: an agent i gets all the
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allocations of its representatives i1, . . . ic. The allocation of dummy items is
ignored.
Let q′ be the allocation as a result of applying PS with agent set N and item
set O′, but for each j = 0 to c− 1, we change the name of each agent i to ij+1
in time interval [j, j + 1]. Note that computing r and q′ takes time (cn)2. The
allocation has a corresponding bistochastic matrix in which the rows correspond
to the representatives and the columns correspond to the items. Each entry
in the matrix represents the amount of the corresponding item eaten by the
corresponding representative.
Note that since q′ is bistochastic, a permutation matrix P ′k consistent with
q′ exists by Birkhoff’s theorem. We want to show that any such matrix P ′k must
correspond to an RB-allocation of items in O′ to agents inN . The RB-allocation
is viewed as proceeding in rounds. In each round, each of the representatives
representing the n agents pick a most preferred available item. In the j-th round,
the representatives involved are 1j, . . . , nj. In any P
′
k, each item is allocated to
an agent representative and each agent representative gets one item. In order to
establish that P ′k is an RB-allocation of N , it is sufficient to prove two claims:
(1) no representative agent strictly prefers any item picked in a later round; and
(2) within each round, the items allocated to the representative agents are as a
result of sequential allocation.
Claim (1) follows from the fact that no representative ij strictly prefers any
item allocated in a later round. The reason is that when it stopped eating in
its turn, it was always eating an item at least as preferred as in later rounds.
Next, we prove Claim (2). Consider any round in which each representative
receives one item. We claim that no set of representatives want to reallocate the
items given in that round to get an improvement for all representatives in the
set. Suppose for contradiction there is a trading cycle in which every agent in
the cycle improves: o1, 1, o2, 2, . . . , oj , j. Representative 1 prefers item o2 over
o1 which means that it started eating o1 after o2 was finished. Since 1 ate a
strictly positive fraction of o1, it implies that o1 finishes strictly after o2. By
a similar argument each i ∈ {1, . . . j − 1} wants to get oi+1 which means that
it started eating oi after oi+1 was finished. Agent j prefers item o1 over oj
which means that it started eating oj after o1 was finished which means that
oj finishes strictly after o1. But then the order of the items according to the
finishing times is: o1, oj , oj−1, . . . , o3, o2, o1. We have shown that o1 has two
different finishing times which is a contradiction. Since there exists no trading
cycle for representatives in the same round, we know that the items in the round
can be allocated as a result of sequential allocation.
From the two claims above, the allocation P ′k is an RB-allocation for agents in
N if each agent gets the allocations of its representatives. Since any permutation
matrix consistent with q′ also corresponds to an RB-allocation, we can use P ′k
as one of the permutation matrices in which q′ is decomposed during Birkhoff’s
decomposition. We can continue decomposing q′ into permutation matrices until
we can represent q′ by a convex combination of at most K ≤ (cn)2 permutation
matrices P ′1, . . . , P
′
K . Each permutation matrix in the decomposition can be
computed by computing a perfect matching in a corresponding bipartite graph
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via the Hopcroft-Karp-Karzanov algorithm which takes time O((cn)2.5).
Finally, note that we can convert allocations (q′, P ′1, . . . , P
′
K) for instance I
′
into the corresponding allocations (q, P1, . . . , PK) for instance I. We do so by
removing the dummy items and for each i ∈ N , giving the allocations of all
the representatives i1, . . . , ic to agent i. Note that q is the outcome of running
PS on instance I. Also, P1, . . . , PK are RB-allocations for instance I and hence
EF1 for instance I.
Remark 1. Algorithm 1 is combinatorial algorithm that computes a lottery
over at most (cn)2 ≤ (m+ n)2 deterministic allocations. By Carathe´odory’s
Theorem, any n×m random allocation that is represented by a convex combina-
tion of a given K deterministic allocations, can also be represented by at most
nm + 1 deterministic allocations among the K deterministic allocations. We
can reduce the support of the lottery returned by Algorithm 1 to one involving at
most nm+1 deterministic EF1 and SD-efficient allocations as follows. By using
Gaussian elimination, we compute the subset of the set of matrices {P1, . . . , Pk}
that forms the basis of P1, . . . , Pk. We can then compute a convex combination
of the matrices in the basis to achieve the same outcome q.
We note that whereas our algorithm provides a way to implement PS by EF1
allocations, not every implementation of the PS outcome may satisfy ex-post
EF1. For example, consider the case of two agents with identical preferences
over two items. In that case, tossing a coin and then giving both items to one
agent is ex-ante equivalent to the PS outcome. However, it is not EF1 if agents
have strictly positive utilities for both items.
Algorithm 1 bears similarities to the exponential-time Algorithm 1 (Recur-
sive PS) of Freeman et al. [14]. Just like their algorithm, we make agents
successively eat one unit of items. Unlike the algorithm of Freeman et al., we
derive the lottery decomposition only after the PS outcome has been computed.
In contrast, Freeman et al. probabilistically generate a partial deterministic al-
location after each unit time. Their algorithm “branches out into a polyno-
mial number of subinstances” a polynomial number of times which makes it an
exponential-time algorithm. In order to ensure polynomial-time computability,
they resort to a result by Gro¨tschel et al. [15] about convex polytopes and sep-
aration oracles. Kesten et al. [20] also look at lottery implementation of the PS
rule. However, their focus is on allocations with single-unit demand, in which
case, any balanced deterministic allocation in the support is trivially EF1.
Next, we present a simple example showing how our algorithm works. The
example has the same preference profile as Example 2 of Freeman et al. [14].
Example 2. Consider the example in which N = {1, 2}, O = {a, b, c, d} and
the agents have the following preferences over the four items.
u1(a) > u1(b) > u1(c) > u1(d)
u2(a) > u2(c) > u2(b) > u2(d)
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The exact utilities do not matter since our algorithm only takes into account
the underlying ordinal preferences of the agents. If we run the PS algorithm, we
get the following outcome:
r =
a b c d( )
1 1/2 1 0 1/2
2 1/2 0 1 1/2
Since m is a multiple of n, D = ∅ and hence O′ = O ∪ D = O. We now
show how to achieve our desired lottery to achieve the PS outcome. We run the
PS rule on (N,O′,%′) to get allocation r. For the outcome, for each agent’s
bundle, we let successive representative agents to eat exactly one unit of items
one by one to get the the following allocation.
q′ =
a b c d



11 1/2 1/2 0 0
21 1/2 0 1/2 0
12 0 1/2 0 1/2
22 0 0 1/2 1/2
The unique decomposition of q′ is
1
2
a b c d



11 1 0 0 0
21 0 0 1 0
12 0 1 0 0
22 0 0 0 1
+ 12
a b c d



11 0 1 0 0
21 1 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 1
22 0 0 1 0
Translating these for our original instance we get the following decomposi-
tion.
q = 12
a b c d( )
1 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 1 1
+ 12
a b c d( )
1 0 1 0 1
2 1 0 1 0
We also note that if we assume negative utilities instead of positive utilities,
we still get SD-EF for PS. For the ex-post guarantee, we get ex-post EF2.
4. Additionally Achieving Efficiency
In this section, we consider the additional issue of efficiency. Before, we
proceed, we present some definitions.
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Efficiency Properties. A random allocation p is fractional Pareto optimal (fPO)
if there exists no other random allocation q such that ui(qi) ≥ ui(pi) for all
i ∈ N and ui(qi) > ui(pi) for some i ∈ N . A deterministic allocation p is
Pareto optimal (PO) if there exists no other deterministic allocation q such
that ui(qi) ≥ ui(pi) for all i ∈ N and ui(qi) > ui(pi) for some i ∈ N . A random
allocation p is SD-efficient is there exists no random allocation q such that
qi %
SD
i pi for all i ∈ N and qi ≻
SD
i pi for some i ∈ N . An allocation p is weakly
SD-efficient is there exists no allocation q such that qi ≻SDi pi for all i ∈ N .
Note that fPO implies PO which implies SD-efficiency which in turn implies
weak SD-efficiency. Just as in the case of fairness, we will consider efficiency of
both the ex-ante random allocation as well as efficiency properties of the ex-post
deterministic allocations that are involved in the lottery.
We note that the random allocation maximizing the Nash social welfare is
well-known to be equivalent to the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes
solution (see e.g., [23, 13]) and satisfies fPO as well as ex-ante envy-freeness.
However, due to Theorem 3 of Freeman et al. [14], a rule that is fPO and
ex-ante envy-free cannot be ex-post EF1.
Since the outcome returned by Algorithm 1 is a lottery implementation of the
PS rule outcome, our algorithm also inherits all the desirable ex-ante properties
that the PS rule and its outcome are known to satisfy. Note that Algorithm 1
first breaks ties in the ordinal preferences before running the PS algorithm. This
results in the outcome satisfying weak SD-efficiency rather than SD-efficiency if
there are indeed ties in the original preferences. If we care about SD-efficiency,
then we do not artificially break any ties and can run the extended probabilistic
serial (EPS) algorithm of Katta and Sethuraman [19]. The EPS algorithmmakes
coordinated choices for agents to eat one of their most preferred items and uses
parametric network flows to compute the outcome. For number of items m ≥ n,
the algorithm takes time O(m3 logm).5
The exact specification of our EPS-Lottery algorithm is to take the PS-
Lottery algorithm and replace Step 5 with the following step: Run EPS on
instance (N,O′,%′′N) to get a random outcome r. Here, the preference profile
%′′ is the same as %′ except that only ties within D are broken lexicographically
and ties are within O are not broken. Therefore the returned outcome r and
hence q′ is SD-efficient rather than just weak SD-efficient. The argument of im-
plementing the outcome with EF1 deterministic allocations remains unchanged.
The running time is unchanged as well as the bottleneck step is to compute a
Birkhoff decomposition which takes time O((cn)4).
Note that if a random allocation q is SD-efficient, then in any decomposition
of q, each of the deterministic allocations is SD-efficient as well. The reason is
5The orginal EPS algorithm of Katta and Sethuraman [19] is presented for the case of
single-unit demands. However, it can easily be extended to the case of multiple items (see
e.g., the Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) algorithm [5]). CCEA is described in
the context of cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations. It also applies to allocation of
items: each cake segment can be treated as a separate item.
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that if one of the deterministic allocations is not SD-efficient, then q is not SD-
efficient. Hence, our algorithm additionally achieves SD-efficiency both ex-ante
and ex-post.
Theorem 2. Let c = ⌈m/n⌉. The EPS-Lottery Algorithm runs takes time
O((cn)4) and computes a lottery over at most (cn)2 ≤ (m + n)2 deterministic
EF1 allocations that is equivalent to the outcome of the extended probabilistic
serial algorithm (which is SD-envy-free and SD-efficient).
We note that our algorithm does not achieve ex-post Pareto optimality.
One approach to achieving ex-post PO and ex-post EF1 is to check certain
random allocations for these properties. Next, we show for an arbitrary random
allocation, checking whether it is ex-post EF1 and ex-post Pareto optimal is
NP-hard.
Theorem 3. For n agents and n items, checking whether a given random alloca-
tion can be implemented by a lottery over EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations is
NP-hard. For n agents and n items, checking whether a given random allocation
can be implemented by a lottery over SD-EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations is
NP-hard.
Proof. Aziz et al. [4] proved that for n agents and n items, checking whether a
given random allocation can be implemented by a lottery over balanced Pareto
optimal allocations is NP-hard. Their setting assumed ordinal preferences but
it works as well for any cardinal preferences consistent with the ordinal pref-
erences. We consider utility functions ui consistent with ordinal preference ≻i
and assume that ui(o) > 0 for all o ∈ O. Since ui(o) > 0 for all o ∈ O, we know
that in any unbalanced deterministic allocation one agent i ∈ N gets zero items
and another agent j gets at least two items. Even if one of j’s items is removed,
i will be envious of j. Hence, an unbalanced allocation is not EF1. In the other
direction, a balanced allocation gives one item to each agent. Even if an agent
i ∈ N is envious of agent j, agent i will not be envious if j’s item is removed.
We have established that for n agents and n items, the set of deterministic EF1
allocations is equal to the set of deterministic balanced allocations. Therefore,
the set of deterministic EF1 and Pareto optimal allocations is equivalent to the
set of deterministic balanced and Pareto optimal allocations. It follows that
checking whether a given random allocation can be implemented by a lottery
over EF1 and Pareto optimal allocation is NP-hard.
The same argument also works for the problem of checking whether a given
random allocation can be implemented by a lottery over SD-EF1 and Pareto
optimal allocations.
5. Impossibility Results
We first recall that Freeman et al. [14] proved that even for two agents,
ex-ante fPO, ex-ante envy-freeness, and ex-post EF1 are incompatible. In this
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section, we present a couple of more impossibility results. The results are logi-
cally incomparable to the main impossibility result of Freeman et al. [14]. Our
first impossibility is the following one.
Theorem 4. Ex-ante SD-EF, ex-post EF1, and ex-post PO are incompatible
even for 2 agents.
Proof. Consider the example in which N = {1, 2}, O = {a, b1, b2, b3} and the
agents have the following utilities over four items.
a b1 b2 b3
1 7 1 1 1
2 4 2 2 2
The three items b1, b2, b3 are identical items that we refer to as b items. Ex-
ante SD-EF implies that each agent in expectation gets 1/2 of a and 1.5 units of
type b items. Our first claim is that in any lottery implementing such an ex-ante
SD-EF allocation, there is at least one ex-post allocation in which agent 2 must
get item a. This follows from the fact that agent 2 gets 1/2 of a in expectation.
Our second claim is that in any deterministic ex-post EF1 and ex-post PO
allocation, agent 2 cannot get item a. Suppose for contradiction that agent 2
gets a. Then, EF1 requires that agent 1 gets at least 2 items of type b. But then,
agent 1 can exchange these two items for a to obtain a Pareto improvement.
From the two claims above, it follows that for the problem instance, there
exists no lottery over ex-post EF1 and ex-post PO outcomes that implements
the SD-EF random outcome.
Next, we point out that ex-ante fPO and ex-ante SD-EF are incompatible
even for 2 agents. The theorem follows directly from Theorem 5 of Aziz and Ye
[5] but we re-prove it in our context for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 5. Ex-ante fPO and ex-ante SD-EF are incompatible even for 2
agents.
Proof. Consider the following two-agent profile.
a b
1 u1(a) u1(b)
2 u2(a) u2(b)
Consider an SD-EF and ex-ante PO allocation p. Suppose
u1(a), v
1
b , u2(a), u2(b) > 0 in such a way that u1(a) > u1(b) and u2(a) > u2(b)
and u1(a)
u1(b)
> u2(a)
u2(b)
. Due to SD-EF, the outcome should be
p =
a b( )
1 1/2 1/2
2 1/2 1/2
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On the other hand, in order for the mechanism to be ex-ante fPO, p1,b = 0 or
p2,a = 1.
6. Binary Utilities
We assumed that the agents have additive utilities. If we consider the case
in which agents have 1-0 utilities, we can achieve stronger results. We show that
our EPS-lottery algorithm satisfies very strong properties when agents have 1-0
utilities. In order to ensure ex-ante efficiency of the EPS-lottery algorithm under
1-0 utilities, we can assume that agents do not consume zero utility items and
leave them for the consumption by other agents as is done by the Controlled
Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) algorithm of Aziz and Ye [5]. In case this
leads to unbalanced allocations, we can make the allocation balanced by adding
appropriate number of extra dummy items so that we can implement our lottery
decomposition algorithm for a balanced allocation.
Before we proceed, let us recall the definition of leximin optimality. For an
allocation π we denote by ~u(π) ∈ Rn the vector of the utilities in π sorted in
increasing order. For two vectors ~u,~v ∈ Rk, we say that ~u leximin-dominates ~v,
written ~u ≻lex ~v, if there exists an i ≤ k such that ~uj = ~vj , ∀j < i, and ~ui > ~vi.
Finally, π is leximin-optimal if there is no π′ such that ~u(π′) ≻lex ~u(π).
Under 1-0 utilities, it is known that the following rules are equivalent
and polynomial-time computable: (1) leximin rule (2) maximum Nash welfare
(MNW) rule (3) competitive equilibirum with equal incomes (CEEI) [23] and
(4) Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) rule [5] (which can be viewed
as an extension for EPS for multi-unit demands that is also careful about zero
utilities). For example, CEEI and MNW are well-known to be equivalent even
for general additive utilities. Under binary utilities, leximin, CEEI, and CCEA
are equivalent [5]. CCEA satisfies envy-freeness. The conclusion about envy-
freeness is also derived from the fact that CEEI outcomes are envy-free (see, e.g.
Vazirani [24]). It is well-known that under additive utilities, the utility profile
of the agents is unique (see, e.g., Vazirani [24]).
For 1-0 utilities, the rules above are known to be ex-ante group-strategyproof
(no group of agents can misreport their preferences so that all agents get at least
as much utility and at least one agent gets strictly more utility). This fact has
been known before as well (see, e.g., Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8], Katta and
Sethuraman [19] and Aziz and Ye [5]). Since the rules are equivalent to the
leximin rule, the outcome is by definition leximin optimal and hence ex-ante
fPO.
We have already shown that an outcome of the EPS rule can be implemented
by a lottery over EF1 allocations. Also, every deterministic allocation consistent
with the SD-efficient random outcome is SD-efficient (follows from Lemma 2
of Katta and Sethuraman [19]) and hence ex-post Pareto optimal for binary
utilities. Therefore, we achieve ex-post EF1 and ex-post Pareto optimality.
Theorem 6. For binary utilities, the EPS-Lottery Algorithm is group-
strategyproof, ex-ante fPO, ex-post fPO, ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post EF1.
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Its outcome is ex-ante equivalent to the leximin random allocation as well as the
maximum Nash welfare allocation.
The theorem above recovers some results that have been proved by Halpern
et al. [16] including their Theorem 4 and Corollary 1. Our method of achieving
a lottery over EF1 and ex-post fPO allocations is different. In their paper, they
achieve the EF1 lottery by invoking the bihierarchy framework introduced by
Budish et al. [10].
7. Conclusion
We studied the problem of simultaneously achieving desirable fairness prop-
erties ex-post and ex-ante. Our main contribution is an algorithm to find a
lottery over EF1 allocations that is ex-ante equivalent to the outcome of the
(E)PS rule. We noted that we actually compute a lottery over RB-allocations
that satisfy strong EF1. Figure 2 depicts the logical relations between various
properties. It also shows some sets of properties that are possible or not possible
to satisfy simultaneously.
ex-ante
fairness
ex-ante
SD-EF
ex-ante
EF
ex-post
fairness
ex-post
SD-EF1
ex-post
EF1
ex-ante
efficiency
ex-ante
fPO
ex-ante
SD-eff
ex-post
efficiency
ex-post
fPO
ex-post
PO
ex-post
SD-eff
Theorem 2
Theorem 3 [14]
Theorem 4
Theorem 5
Key
Figure 2: Logical relations between fairness and efficiency concepts. An arrow from (A) to
(B) denotes that (A) implies (B). The properties in green are simultaneously satisfied by
our algorithm. The combined properties in the pink shapes (dotted, dashed, or shaded) are
impossible to simultaneously satisfy.
We noted that under 1-0 utilities, all meaningful ex-ante and ex-post fairness
and efficiency properties are simultaneously satisfied. Coming back to general
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additive utilities, we recall that our algorithm achieves ex-ante SD-efficiency
and ex-ante SD-EF. If we wish to replace ex-ante SD-efficiency with ex-ante
fPO, then such an algorithm does not exist in view of Theorem 5. Again, note
that our algorithm achieves ex-post SD-efficiency, ex-ante SD-EF, and ex-post
SD-EF1. Even if we weaken ex-post SD-EF1 to ex-post EF1 but strenghten
ex-post SD-efficiency to ex-post PO, we again get an impossibility (Theorem 4).
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Appendix A. Probabilistic Serial (PS) Algorithm
We write the formal definition of PS from [21] as an algorithm. For any
o ∈ O′ ⊂ O, let N(o,O′) = {i ∈ N : o ≻i b for every b ∈ O′} be the set of agents
whose most preferred house in O′ is o. Let maxN (O
′) denote {o ∈ O′ : ∃i ∈
N s.t. o = max≻i(O
′)}. PS is defined as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 PS
Input: (N,O,≻)
Output: p the random assignment returned by PS
1 j ←− 0 (j is the stage of the algorithm)
2 O0 ←− O; t0 ←− 0; p0i,o ←− 0 for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O.
3 while Oj 6= ∅ do
4 for o ∈ maxN (Oj) do
5 tj+1(o)←−
1−
∑
i∈N
p
j
i,o
|N(o,Oj)| {finishing times of items that are being eaten}
6 end for
7 tj+1 ←− mino∈maxN (Oj) t
j+1(o) {the next time point in which some item
is finished}
8 for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O do
9 if i ∈ N(o,Oj) then
10 pj+1i,o ←− p
j
i,o + t
j+1 − tj
11 else
12 pj+1i,o ←− p
j
i,o
13 end if
14 end for
15 Oj+1 ←− Oj \ {o ∈ maxN (Oj) : tj(o) = tj} {Latest eaten items are
removed}
16 j ←− j + 1
17 end while
18 return p = pj
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Appendix B. Birkhoff’s Algorithm
Algorithm 3 Birkhoff’s Algorithm
Input: Bistochastic square matrixM with some non-zero entries and rows R
and columns C.
Output: Permutation matrices P1, . . . PK for some K such that
∑k
i=1 λiPi =
M .
1 Initalize i to 0; initalize M to M ′.
2 while M ′ has a non-zero entry do
3 i←− i+ 1
4 Compute a permutation matrix Pi consistent with M
′ as follows. {One
can use the Hopcroft-Karp-Karzanov algorithm to compute Pi as follows:
Compute a perfect matching Li in a bipartite graph (R ∪ C,E) where
(i, j) ∈ E iff M ′i,j > 0. Let Pi be the permutation matrix corresponding
to matching Li.}
5 M is set to M − λiPi where λi is the smallest non-zero entry in Pi.
6 end while
7 return P1, . . . , Pi
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